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4.  Carl Menger and Friedrich von Wieser on the role of knowledge and beliefs 
in the emergence and evolution of institutions*
 
Agnès Festré 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The revival of interest in the issue of knowledge in recent years1 has rarely given way to 
systematic studies of the nature of knowledge within mainstream economics. Within 
this tradition, an entire generation of economists, following the seminal work of Arrow 
(1955, 1962), has confined scientific and technical knowledge to information, and 
argued that the knowledge generated by research activities possessed certain generic 
properties of public goods that implied that such activities could not be produced or 
distributed through the workings of competitive markets. By contrast, within the 
Austrian tradition2, but also in Polanyi (1967) and in the case of evolutionary 
economics, we find explicit recognition of the influential aspect of knowledge in human 
action.  
The contribution of the Austrian tradition to this topic, culminating in the works of 
Hayek, is indeed undisputable3. Several reasons may explain this special focus on 
knowledge.  
First and most importantly, it should be reminded that the Austrian economic 
tradition assumes that human action takes place in time and in a context of uncertainty4. 
Such an assertion implies, first, that in contrast to neo-classical economics, data such as 
individual preferences or production techniques are not given, but gradually take shape 
through individual action, experience and learning as well as under the influence of 
institutions and collective norms or beliefs.   
Second, from a methodological perspective, the Austrian tradition is associated with 
the subjectivist viewpoint that it develops. This implies that, though often on a rather 
diverging basis according to the author considered, a fundamental heterogeneity in 
individuals is assumed. 
From these two general arguments it follows that knowledge and beliefs play a 
fundamental role in connecting agents’ decisions through time. Several questions then 
arise: how do individuals acquire knowledge? What is the nature of knowledge? How 
knowledge is created and diffused within the society? And finally how coordination 
arises? 
The answers to those questions vary substantially among Austrian authors.  To give 
only two polar cases, Mises, who endorses an apriorist approach, considers that 
knowledge consists of a priori logical categories such as causality and that human 
action is always intentional, rational and conscious, although he views history and law 
as playing some role in the determination of individual action (Mises [1949] 1996): p. 
11). By contrast, for Hayek who favors a connectionist approach based on his 1952 
book Sensory Order5, knowledge is conceived as an abstract process undergoing change 
in relation to new individual experiences6.  
This oversimplified comparison gives a hint of the variety of the conceptions of the 
nature of knowledge within the Austrian tradition. It follows that conceptions regarding 
the role played by knowledge in economic and social activity will also vary by author.  
For Hayek, since the process of classification into mental categories that underlies 
knowledge acquisition by individual agents is both abstract (in the sense of meta-
conscious) and idiosyncratic, it is obvious that coordination of individual actions as well 
as communication between agents constitute crucial problems. As far as Mises’ analysis 
is concerned, communication issues are less central although coordination of individual 
actions remains an important question since it involves time as well as uncertainty. 
The importance attached to the problem of coordination of individual actions has 
also led the Austrian tradition to wonder about the role of institutions in economic and 
social life. The first who addressed this issue is the founding father of the Austrian 
School, Carl Menger. In his Principles (1871), he devoted an entire chapter to the 
question of the emergence of money to illustrate the distinction between organic and 
pragmatic institutions as regards their mode of emergence. For Menger, indeed, the case 
of the emergence of money is a striking example of how organic institutions – i.e., 
institutions that are not the result of individual’s will, nor the fulfillment of a collective 
objective, in contrast with pragmatic institutions that are the result of an individual or 
group of individuals pursuing an intentional goal – emerge. This idea remained a key 
proposition of most Austrians economists - as the well-known statement by Hayek: 
‘human action but not human design’ reminds us - even if, both the methodological 
background and the conception of knowledge of the author considered again reflect on 
the way he views institutions and their role in economic and social activity.  
In this paper, we will focus on two authors: the founding father of the Austrian 
School, Carl Menger, and one of his direct successors, Friedrich von Wieser, who are 
emblematic of the way Austrian deals with the problems of knowledge and 
coordination. More particularly, we will contrast their respective conceptions of 
knowledge (and beliefs) in relation to the role of institutions. We will stress that, 
starting from a rather similar methodological background and being interested in 
solving questions such as how institutions emerge in an environment characterized by 
individuals’ heterogeneity, time and spatial constraints, they however provide divergent 
perspectives of institutional dynamics. 
Before entering into the details of their respective contributions to this field of 
analysis, let us make some general comments. 
First, Menger and Wieser share the view that economic institutions are the product of 
individual action and not necessarily of human design. In other terms, they are 
interested in the self-regulating or spontaneous order properties of economic institutions 
or collective entities while, at the same time, they cannot conceive them as not resulting 
from the interactions between individual agents, in compliance with the principle of 
methodological individualism. The process of emergence of institutions must therefore 
be explained from the perspective of heterogenous individual agents. It follows that 
assumptions concerning the nature of individual (or inter-individual) knowledge, the 
way it is transmitted from one individual to the other, and how it evolves through time, 
are determining to a large extent the role and the properties of institutions. In the 
following, we endeavour to contrast Menger and Wieser’s respective conceptions of 
institutions from this angle.  
Second, they both refer, even if implicitly, to two kinds of knowledge (or belief), 
namely, individual knowledge (or belief), on the one hand, and collective knowledge (or 
beliefs) on the other hand. As we will show, the articulation between these two kinds of 
knowledge appears to be essential in order to analyse such phenomena as the emergence 
or the maintenance of institutions as well as institutional change.  
However, Menger and Wieser do not perceive institutions the same way, the former 
being more focused on the problem of emergence of institutions, the latter being more 
interested in the problem of institutional change in relation to the forces of power. 
 
 
4.2. Menger: the role of knowledge in the emergence of institutions 
 
For Menger, knowledge is central to economic phenomena in a very general and broad 
way. First, individual knowledge provides the foundations of a subjectivist conception 
of value. As reminded by Hayek in his introduction to the English edition of Menger’s 
Grundsätze (translated into English as Principles of Economics), Menger defines value 
as “the importance which concrete goods, or quantities of goods receive for us from the 
fact that we are conscious of being dependent on our disposal over them for the 
satisfaction of our wants” (Menger quoted by Hayek, Introduction to Principles of 
Economics 1976, p. 18). On the basis of this definition, it appears that value can hardly 
be conceived as a static and objective concept, reducible to the concept of marginal 
utility, as sometimes alleged. Unlike classical and neo-classical economists, Menger is 
indeed not concerned about static resource allocation, but rather about resource use as a 
result of a better knowledge of production processes. Moreover, perceptions by 
individuals of their economic needs, conceived as the knowledge of the relationships 
between means and objectives is essential in the definition of economic value. 
In another passage of his Principles, Menger explicitly endorses this vision by 
writing that “the quantities of consumption goods at human disposal are limited only by 
the extent of human knowledge of the causal connections between things, and by the 
extent of human, control over these things” (Menger [1871] 1979, p. 74). In this 
quotation, knowledge is conceived as general knowledge that is likely to expand with 
economic development. Menger indeed considers that any satisfaction of human needs 
begins from acquiring knowledge. For him, the driving force of economic life lies in 
gaining knowledge about relevant situations on a twofold basis. On the one hand, agents 
must know what their economic objectives are, i.e., their economic needs and how those 
ends can be achieved through time given the time- consuming nature of economic 
processes: “clarity about the objective of their endeavour is an essential factor in the 
success of every activity of men” and moreover, “it is also certain that knowledge of 
requirements for goods in future periods is the first prerequisite for the planning of all 
human activity directed to the satisfaction of need”. On the other hand, given any 
definite objective, people must know which are the means available to them in order to 
achieve their objectives:  “the second factor that determines the success of human 
activity is the knowledge gained by men of the means available to them for the 
attainment of the desired ends” (Menger [1871] 1979, p. 74).  
Those two directions of knowledge growth permit to define the usefulness of things, 
i.e., individuals’ knowledge of the causal relationship between means and ends. This 
kind of knowledge can be illustrated by Menger’s reference, borrowed from Aristotle, to 
“imaginary goods” as a counterexample. Menger indeed defines those imaginary goods 
as things  “that are incapable of being placed in any kind of causal connection with the 
satisfaction of human needs [but] are nevertheless treated by men as goods” (Menger 
[1871] 1979, p. 53). For Menger, this situation arises “when attributes, and therefore 
capacities, are erroneously ascribed to things that do not really possess them” or “when 
non-existent human needs are mistakenly assumed to exist” (ibid). The first case may be 
exemplified by cosmetics, love potions or medicines that were administered to the sick 
peoples of early civilizations, while examples of the second case may be medicines for 
diseases that do not actually exist, or statues, buildings etc. used by pagan people for the 
worship of idols (ibid). In sum, people may, owing to their ignorance or misperception 
of either their means or their ends, unduly consider some things as being useful, even 
though they are not. With the passing of time and thanks to economic progress, people 
are assumed to learn and have a better knowledge of their means and needs as well as of 
the relationships between means and ends in terms of usefulness. As mentioned by 
Menger in a footnote, the distinction between imaginary goods and (useful) goods can 
be connected to individuals’ rationality, as Aristotle suggests it when he distinguishes 
between true and imaginary goods according to whether the needs arise from rational 
deliberation (in the case of true goods) or are irrational (in the case of imaginary goods) 
(ibid. fn. p. 53). However, Menger does not elaborate on this line of argument even if he 
seems that he endorses such a distinction. One may however consider that this 
distinction is unfortunate since it is possible to conceive rationality in a more general 
perspective, as for instance in the line of Raymond Boudon, and therefore, to consider 
that individuals have ‘goods reasons’, even from the viewpoint of the criterion of 
usefulness, to connect some means with ends in cases that would be considered as 
falling into the category of imaginary goods for Menger. 
A second question arises about individuals’ rationality: to which extent people can 
connect means and ends given the time constraints and the uncertainty that characterises 
economic activity? Clearly, for Menger, the correct foresight of the quantities available 
for the satisfaction of intended needs is unrealistic, so that “in practical life (…) men 
customary do not even attempt to obtain results as fully exact as is possible in the 
existing state of the arts of measuring and taking inventory, but are satisfied with just 
the degree of exactness that is necessary for practical purposes” (ibid. p. 90).  
More generally, knowledge of causalities between means and ends is a principle that 
guides economic activity as a whole and therefore, must not be understood as restricted 
to exchange analysis. First, Menger’s theoretical framework is based on the idea of the 
temporal antecedence of the production activity over that of exchange. Second, as well-
known, he provided a microanalysis of the production structure defined as a temporal 
process characterized by vertical relations between different goods. The vertical 
hierarchy of goods or, in Menger’s terms, the order of the respective goods involved in 
the productive process is defined according to the degree of closeness of the good to the 
final stage of consumption. In terms of causal relations, this means that the basic direct 
causality between means and ends of one consumer does not differ in nature from the 
causality between productive goods of different orders within the production structure 
of one producer, but only in degree: the more remote in the production structure the 
good is the more indirect the causality is. Moreover, the value of remote goods is 
derived from the value of the final consumer goods they contribute to produce.  
As Menger notes, this perspective challenges Adam Smith’s conception of 
economic progress based on the principle of increasing division of labor. For Menger, it 
is clear that the increase in the volume of consumption goods going with economic 
progress is not the exclusive effect of the division of labor, but should also be imputed 
to an increased variety of kinds of economic goods, and as a corollary, to an increased 
knowledge of the causal relationships between means and ends, which requires an 
increased knowledge of the already mentioned dual-purpose knowledge (knowledge of 
the ends / knowledge of the means) but now extended due to time constraints: the 
knowledge of the “quantity of goods they will need to satisfy their needs during the time 
period over which their plans extend” and the knowledge of “the quantities of goods at 
their disposal for the purpose of meeting those requirements” (ibid p. 80) 
This is only in this sense that it is possible to understand Menger’s sentence “the 
quantities of consumption goods at human disposal are limited only by the extent of 
human knowledge of the causal connections between things (…)” (Menger [1871] 
1979, p. 74). 
But as already noticed this knowledge cannot, by nature, be complete: “error is 
inseparable from knowledge” (ibid, p. 148). With the extension of the production 
structure and the strengthening of time constraints, perfect foresight is an even less 
realistic assumption. Indeed, Menger saw the roots of uncertainty in the time-consuming 
nature of economic processes. Assuming that all production takes time, producers have 
no way of knowing for certain that the market conditions prevailing when the 
production is ready for delivery. The result is that price of the finished product bears no 
resemblance to the costs of production, since the two represent market conditions at 
very different points on time. To a certain extent, one could say that the principle of 
increasing knowledge goes hand in hand with a principle of increasing uncertainty. 
Moreover, the increasing number of kinds of goods raises the problem of factor 
complementarity and substitutability. 
Let us now envisage how Menger deals with these two issues.  
 
As economic development proceeds, some individuals specialized in the acquisition 
of knowledge emerge. It is the case, for instance, of merchants, industrialists, who act as 
middlemen between “members of the society with whom they maintain trading 
connections” (ibid). With the passing of time, such middlemen constitute a class in its 
own right: they are “a special class of economizing individuals who take care of the 
intellectual and mechanical parts of exchange operations for society and who are 
reimbursed for this with a part of the gains for trade” (ibid. p. 239). These middlemen 
are referred to by Menger when he discusses the passage from the “isolated household” 
to the “organized economy” involving a transitory state of organization corresponding 
to the system of production on order (Menger [1871] 1976, see Arena and Gloria-
Palermo 2001, p. 137-38). From this perspective, economic development can be seen as 
a process of division of knowledge – a principle that will be later systematized by 
Hayek, though from a different methodological perspective. This naturally leads 
Menger to elaborate further upon the role of organization and institutions with respect to 
the problem of knowledge. However, he is not very wordy concerning the conditions in 
terms of knowledge (explicit or tacit knowledge7, heterogeneity in agents’ cognitive 
capabilities) for those organizations to emerge, to be maintained or to be efficient.  
 
There is in Menger’s writing evidence that those middlemen, who arise with the 
development of the market, are more aware of the deficiencies of the previous 
organization of markets or have a better knowledge of their personal interest, which 
leads to improve the efficiency of exchanges. But this does not imply that those 
intermediaries do possess a distinctive kind of knowledge, such as practical knowledge 
that would be associated to their intermediation activity. More convincingly, what 
Menger puts forward is that they display a different kind of rationality, in the sense that 
they act as innovators or as leaders (see Arena and Gloria-Palermo 2001, p. 138). This 
assumption of a fragmented population made of leaders and followers is also implicit in 
Menger’s description of the emergence of money as we shall show. 
 
Concerning the problem of factor complementarity and substitutability, Menger 
emphasizes the principle of complementarity between goods of different orders, which 
he states as follows: “We can bring quantities of goods of higher order to the production 
of given quantities of goods of lower order, and thus finally to the meetings of our 
requirements, only if we are in the position of having the complementary quantities of 
other goods of higher order simultaneously at our disposal” (ibid, p. 85, italics in the 
original). Although this passage stresses the intertemporal complementarity constraint, 
it however does not prevent factor substitutability to occur provided this constraint is 
met.  
This suggests that the specialization / adaptability dilemma, borrowed from 
Richardson (1990)8, does not necessarily apply to Menger’s analysis. As Lachmann 
puts it, the argument rests on the idea that factor complementarity and substituability do 
not represent two mutually exclusive alternatives, but “are phenomena belonging to 
different provinces of the realm of action” (Lachmann 1977, p. 200). While the notion 
of factor complementarity applies to capital goods utilized in the prospect of a joint 
output, the idea of substitutability “is a phenomenon of change, the need for which 
arises whenever something has gone wrong with a prior plan” (ibid). Nevertheless, this 
argument does not preclude the lack of precision of Menger regarding organisational 
implications of both time constraints and uncertainty9.  
This weakness also reflects on the problem of knowledge. As we have stressed 
before, Menger’s explanation of successive stages of productive organization in terms 
of time and space constraints stands at a very general and abstract level of analysis. In 
retrospect on can consider that Menger paved the way for a vast research field of 
research on capital theory, industrial organization and the role of knowledge in 
economic activity. Nevertheless, within the Austrian tradition, the road that will be 
followed focuses more on the prominent role of entrepreneurship than on the firm seen 
as an economic and social device for managing productive constraints. Kirzner’s 
contribution, judging from his insistence on the awareness of the entrepreneur, provides 
a striking example of this tendency. 
 
From a different perspective, Menger’s emphasis on time constraints and limits to 
human knowledge also brings up the issue of learning and its place in economic life. 
Menger’s analysis of the emergence of money provides a good illustration of the 
importance of learning in economic phenomena and, in particular, in the emergence of 
the specific institution of money. The case of the emergence of money is also typical of 
how Menger viewed the problem of emergence of organic – as opposed to pragmatic – 
institutions in his Untersuchungen10: 
 
“How can it be that institutions which serve the common welfare and are 
extremely significant for its development come into being without a common will 
directed toward establishing them?” (Menger [1883] 1963: 146) 
 
In his discussion of the origins of money (Menger 1892, Menger [1871] 1979, 
chapters 7 and 8, Menger [1883] 1963, Book 3, chapter 2), Menger points out that 
individuals do not always get what they want using the barter system. It is both costly 
and time-consuming to find the exact match, identified by Jevons as the ‘double-
coincidence problem’ between individual needs. They tend to abandon direct exchange 
and exchange their goods with more marketable ones. The causes of marketability – 
also referred as saleableness or saleability11 – in commodities is related, according to 
Menger, to different circumstances: to the organization of supply and demand (number 
of buyers, intensity of their needs, importance of their purchasing power, available 
quantity of the commodity), to the inner characteristics of goods (divisibility for 
instance) and to the organization of the market (degree of development of exchanges, of 
speculation and of free trade). Furthermore the saleableness of commodities is also 
conditioned by spatial limits (degree of transportability, degree of development of the 
means of transport, commerce and communication between markets) as well as time 
limits (permanence of needs, durability and cost of preservation of commodities, 
periodicity of the market, the rate of interest, the development of speculation, the weight 
of political restrictions to intertemporal transfers of the commodity) (Menger [1871] 
1976, pp. 246-247). Agents thus progressively learn to select increasingly marketable 
goods and proceeds to indirect exchange, although it does not permit immediate 
satisfaction of their needs: 
 
“The economic interest of the economic individuals, therefore, with increased 
knowledge of their individual interests, without agreement, without legislation 
compulsion,  even without any consideration of public interest, leads them to turn 
over there wares for more marketable ones, even if they do not need the latter for 
their immediate consumer needs” (Menger [1883] 1963: 154) 
 
This positive feedback12 process eventually singles out one commodity, a 
commodity that becomes money. This selection process however is not the result of 
purposefully thinking about the advantages of commonly understood or used money. 
Market participants successfully experience smoother ways of trading for the sake of 
personal goals and, thus, are prone to carry on. In this case, the use of money by market 
participants is a spontaneous outcome of the market process. In other words, they do not 
invent money, nor are they able to know beforehand the superior properties of money in 
exchange, since it is an unintended result of their self-oriented activities. But it is also 
the use of prior or ex ante knowledge that helps people find better ways of carrying out 
transactions. As Menger explains in his 1892 paper on money , “the willing acceptance 
of the medium of exchange presupposes already a knowledge of these interests on the 
part of those economic subjects who are expected to accept in exchange for their wares 
a commodity which in and by itself is perhaps entirely useless to them” (Menger [1892], 
p. 261).  
 
As such, Menger’s explanation is not satisfactory and involves some kind of circular 
reasoning: the question arises as to where this prior knowledge comes from since it is at 
the same time the result of a selection process. Menger’s answer to this question comes 
as follows: “this knowledge never arises in every part of a nation at the same time. It is 
only in the first instance a limited number of economic subjects who will recognize the 
advantage in such a procedure, an advantage which, in itself, is independent of the 
general recognition of a commodity as a medium of exchange (…)” (ibid p. 261).  
To sum up, the process of selection consists in four mechanisms.  
First, it is based on an asymmetry of knowledge between two classes of agents: 
‘leaders’ that are more able to see the advantages of indirect exchanges because they 
possess a better knowledge concerning the saleableness of specific commodities: they 
are referred to by Menger as “the most effective” and the “more intelligent bargainers” 
(Menger 1892, p. 254); and ‘followers’, who imitate them and who progressively 
become aware that through the use of these specific goods become, they can proceed “to 
[their] end much more quickly, more economically and with a greatly probability of 
success” (Menger [1871] 1976, p.258). 
Second, it involves a process of learning by imitation: ‘followers’ indeed imitate 
leaders in their use of money. They want what their neighbours do possess because they 
observe that their neighbours perform better by using ‘money’ than they do themselves 
without it. As Menger explains, “(…) it is admitted, that there is no better method of 
enlightening anyone about his economic interests than that he perceive the economic 
success of those who use the right means to secure their own” (Menger 1892, p. 247) 
The kind of imitation involved here is essentially of the informational type13 since 
‘follower’ imitates the ‘leaders’ because they are supposed to have a better knowledge 
of the properties of money in exchange and perform better.  
 
Third, the selection process is depicted as a self-organizing procedure. As already 
emphasized, Menger only reluctantly admits the intrusion of external or legal 
compulsion in the process of emergence of money. In his 1892 article, he makes clear 
that “money has not been generated by law. In its origin it is a social, and not a state 
institution.” He only admits that “by state recognition and state regulation this social 
institution of money has been perfected and adjusted to the manifold and varying needs 
of evolving commerce (…)” (Menger 1892, p. 255). Clearly, in his analytical 
framework, legal or state compulsion is, at the most, of secondary importance since 
social and economic institutions such as money or the organization of markets are the 
unintended result of interacting agents.  
Fourth, the emergence of money may be depicted as a self-enforcing learning 
process. Menger indeed emphasizes the existence of what economist today would call 
network externalities or network effects, i.e. the idea  that the more the commodity is 
used as an intermediary of exchange, the more it becomes an efficient medium of 
exchange. In this way, a good which was initially used as an intermediate of exchange is 
converted, through “customs and practice” into a “commodity that [comes] to be 
accepted, not merely, but by all economizing individuals in exchange for their own 
commodities” (Menger [1871] 1976, p. 261).   
With respect to the problem of knowledge, Menger appreciates the role of non 
articulable, unconscious knowledge when the use of money becomes ever more 
widespread, though never using the term of tacit knowledge. Rather, he implicitly refers 
to some social or collective knowledge that is embodied in social organic institutions14. 
In other words, under civilization, the individual benefits from more knowledge than he 
is aware of. This is at least one way to explain the fact that useful organic institutions 
cannot be conceived only as a result of deliberate actions15. In other terms, actors 
frequently do better than they know merely because they know better than they are 
aware of knowing.  It is then likely that with the passing of time the use of money 
becomes so anchored within habits and customs of market participants that using it does 
not require any longer the knowledge of its inner qualities in exchange. At this moment, 
using money becomes completely collective tacit knowledge. Although this argument 
anticipates Hayek’s analysis of the process of abstraction of rules, the following passage 
from Menger gives some support to this line of interpretation: 
 
“With economic progress, therefore, we can everywhere observe the phenomenon 
of a certain number of goods, especially those that are more easily saleable at a given 
time and place, becoming, under the powerful influence of custom, acceptable to 
everyone in trade, and thus capable of being given in exchange for any other 
commodity” (ibid, p. 260) 
 
 
In sum, Menger’s conception of knowledge is very general and far-reaching. It 
includes the two kinds of categories of knowledge that are usually distinguished within 
the literature (explicit vs. tacit knowledge) but also involves the articulation between 
individual and collective knowledge. Although Menger does not elaborate fully on the 
mechanisms at works in the articulation between individual and collective knowledge, 
the existence of shared knowledge is however essential for understanding the process of 
emergence of institutions. Moreover, this shared knowledge cannot be built through 
mere conscious imitation of leaders by followers. It is indeed the superposition of a 
collective / tacit knowledge that may explain the self-organizing and self-enforcing 
dimensions of the process of diffusion of money. Finally, it explains why organic 
institutions are the unintended result of interacting individual agents.   
 
 
4.3. Wieser: the role of beliefs in the evolution of institutions 
 Friedrich von Wieser is the least known author within the triumvirate of the founders of 
the Austrian School. On the one hand, he is often viewed as a faithful follower of 
Menger paling into insignificance beside Böhm-Bawerk. On the other hand, his 
inclination in favour of authoritarian political regimes did not contribute to make him 
very well-liked. These circumstances certainly contributed to the underestimation of his 
work. However, as it has been said, Wieser’s contribution to capital and imputation 
theory had a great influence on the development of the intellectual achievements of the 
second generation of the Austrian School even if it is mostly still unappreciated in the 
literature16 (Streissler 1987; Endres 1991). Moreover, from a methodological viewpoint, 
he offers a very interesting mixture of economic analysis and economic sociology that 
shares some common features with Schumpeter’s theoretical construction (see Streissler 
1988, p. 195 and Arena and Gloria-Palermo 2001). 
More peculiarly, Wieser developed a very interesting analysis of the role of 
knowledge and beliefs in economic and social phenomena in relation to the issues of the 
emergence and evolution of institutions. The reminder of the article will be focused on 
this aspect of Wieser’s contribution. The accomplished version of this analysis is to be 
found in his late book Das Gesetz der Macht (translated as The Law of Power), which 
he published only a few month before his death, even if the overall scheme of thought 
of this last piece of writing is already sketched out in one of his previous works: Theorie 
der Gesellschaftlichen Wirtschaft.(translated as Social Economics). More precisely, in 
Social Economics, Wieser is concerned about the deficiencies of a theory of marginal 
utility independent of the distribution of wealth or economic and social inequalities for 
those factors, according to him, do affect subjective individual valuations17. In 
particular, in contrast to Menger, Wieser maintains that political compulsion and power 
do play a decisive role in the formation of individual preferences18. In this same book, 
Wieser contrasts the Theory of the Simple Economy with Social Economics, stating that 
in the latter, social stratification between classes exerts substantial effects on the 
economic activity, and in particular, on individual preferences valuations (see Arena 
2003, p. 303). The existence of three classes implies that the group of ‘mass-
commodities’ has to be evaluated by the marginal utility of the poor, the set of 
‘intermediate goods’ by the preferences of the middle classes and the group of ‘luxury 
goods’, by the valuations of rich people (Wieser [1914] 1927 1967, pp. 157-58). 
But it is in his last contribution, the Law of Power, that Wieser provides an overall 
analysis of society that emphasizes power – power play, the psychology of power – and 
the role of beliefs in the emergence and evolution of institutions. We will therefore 
concentrate on this piece of work of Wieser.  
 
First, let us focus on some important methodological features and terminology of 
Wieser’s overall theoretical approach that might be helpful for understanding his 
perspective on the problems of emergence and evolution of institutions.  
From a methodological standpoint, it is important to note that Wieser departs from 
Menger’s strict methodological individualism and promotes an original view that mixes 
methodological individualism and holism19. This perspective is, for Wieser, a necessary 
one if one wants to deal with social phenomena such as the emergence of institutions. 
He indeed is not satisfied with individualistic explanations that provide no other 
explanation “(…) than the one which suggests itself in the personal sphere for the 
relations between individuals (…).” In particular, such explanations afford no room for 
“the element of constraint or command without which the [S]tate could neither originate 
nor endure and which can be clearly established for money as well” (Wieser [1926] 
1983, p. 146).” In this passage, Wieser implicitly refers to Menger’s explanation of the 
emergence of money, which he considers unsatisfactory for reasons that are not only 
related to the absence of legal or State compulsion but also on other grounds that will be 
explained in the following. Wieser is no more satisfied with the polar case of collectivist 
explanations, stating that “in a roundabout way, [they] lead back to the individualistic 
explanation[s] by taking the people and the masses as a magnified individual” (ibid, p. 
146). For Wieser, there is no hope in those two kinds of monist explanations. He also 
criticizes “dualist explanations”, arguing that they also confront us with problems and 
do not, therefore, constitute a satisfactory alternative. Wieser takes as an example of the 
dualist explanations the classical distinction between the subjective (use) and the 
objective (exchange) value of goods, supposedly able to reconcile respectively the 
“personal or individual influences” and “those influences which transcend the personal 
or individual”. But without a suitable way for connecting those two elements, this 
approach cannot be accepted either. For Wieser, the manner classical economics 
connect the two dimensions is misleading because the “so-called objective exchange 
value does not by any means apply objectively to everybody”. More precisely, on the 
demand size of the market of a particular good, the principle of the objective exchange 
value holds true “only for those who can pay the current price, i.e., for those for whom 
the acquisition of the good brings an increase in utility which at least offsets the 
decrease in utility brought about by the payment of the price”. Symmetrically, on the 
supply side, the principle holds good “only for those to whom the attainable price brings 
an in increase in utility sufficient to compensate for the sacrifice which giving up 
possession of the goods involves” (ibid, p. 147). Wieser therefore concludes that  “the 
objectively determined price gives only the proximate base and not the ultimate 
standard for valuation, for one and the same quantity if money means a quite different 
utility experience for the poor and for the rich person (…)” (ibid, p. 147, italics in the 
original). In other terms, it amounts to saying that the so-called objective exchange 
value is the subjective exchange value for market participants since those who 
participate in exchange are oriented towards the same objective base, i.e., the market 
price. But for those excluded from the market, the objective exchange value has no 
meaning since “its outcome is as subjectively determined as is the personal use value in 
each individual case” (ibid, p. 148). In fine, the contrast between objective exchange 
value and subjective use value is nothing more than a “contrast between a multitude of 
parallel subjective cases and the isolated case” (ibid, italics in the original). 
 
From a terminological viewpoint, Wieser refers to “social institutions” as 
distinguished from “historical formations” with respect to their mode of emergence. 
Social institutions are characterized by the fact that they “are created by governments or 
by other order powers for a deliberate purpose and following a deliberate plan” or “in 
the awareness of a task to be done”,  while ‘historical formations’ “grow up without the 
possibility of one’s becoming aware of a specific creator” but rather as a “searching 
force” Wieser ([1926] 1983, p. 141-45).   
At first sight, Wieser’s distinction is reminiscent of Menger’s distinction between 
organic and pragmatic institutions. By analogy, historical formations could be 
conceived as organic institutions since they are the result of unintended action while 
social institutions should be considered as pragmatic ones since they are the result of 
“intentions, opinions, and available instrumentalities of human social unions or their 
ruler” (Menger [1883] 1963: 145). 
Nevertheless, this analogy does not hold any longer if one reminds that for Menger, 
the distinction between pragmatic and organic institutions follows directly from another 
distinction of a methodological nature: the distinction between two orientations of 
theoretical research, namely the “realistic-empirical” approach and the “exact science” 
one20. Even though Menger admits that these two orientations can supplement each 
other, they nevertheless constitute two logically distinct perspectives. For Wieser, by 
contrast, explanation of social institutions and historical formations cannot be the 
subject of independent analyses. On the one hand, Wieser explains that social 
institutions are always embedded in “historical formations” (Wieser, [1926] 1983: 146) 
in the sense that an emerging social institution must necessary fit or be consistent with 
the contemporary existing historical formation. Wieser takes as examples the market 
institution and monetary institutions, indicating that, “the market system presupposes 
the market as created by the coincidence of supply and demand”, or monetary 
institutions and that “the special monetary arrangements of a country are based on the 
general characteristics of money, which has come about as a result of the tortuous paths 
of commerce (…)” (ibid. p. 143). Generalizing this argument, Wieser maintains that: 
 
“[with] all institutional arrangements it can be clearly seen how in their effect they 
always depend on being properly adjusted to the nature of historical formations 
which serve as their foundations” (Wieser [1926] 1983: 143) 
 
For Wieser indeed, a market system which is not consistent with the law of supply 
and demand cannot succeed. The same is true for “a monetary system attempting to 
maintain a value of money which has become untenable by an excess of monetary 
media issued by the state” (ibid. p. 143). 
One the other hand, historical formations are defined in relation to power, which plays 
an important role in Wieser’s analysis of institutions. This characteristic sets him apart 
from Menger, who takes into account the role of power only in the sense of the 
command of economic resources. In other terms, Menger deals with power as a 
necessary condition for being (or not) in position to use economic goods but does not 
elaborate further on how power is distributed among individuals and how this 
distribution evolves through time and on the interaction of agents or groups of agents. 
By contrast, when referring to historical formations, Wieser notes that they constitute 
particular states of the evolution of the society, characterized by a certain social 
stratification of powers, and which result from “the accord of many personal units of 
consciousness which to a certain degree give up their independence, but without a 
higher encompassing unit of consciousness taking their place” (Wieser [1926] 1983, 
146, italics in the original).  
More precisely, Wieser’s analysis of power is based on two distinctions: on the one 
hand, the distinction between masses and leaders; on the other hand, the distinction 
between internal and external power. 
First, Wieser differentiates between leaders and masses more to put forward that their 
respective behaviours or rationality obey different laws or display a distinct psychology 
of power than to suggest an idea of intellectual superiority of leaders with respect to 
masses or to convey a pejorative meaning to the term ‘mass’. In Wieser’s own terms, 
being a leader “(…) means nothing but to be the first in matters of common concern 
[and] [t]he social function of a leader is to walk in front (…)” (Wieser [1926] 1983, p. 
38). However, the phenomenon of leadership is based on the existence of inequalities 
within a given population: it is governed by the “law of small numbers” based “on the 
social success of small groups” (ibid. p.1). Moreover, it is possible to distinguish 
between two types of leadership according to the mode of their emergence. On the one 
hand, there is the authoritarian kind of leadership, including despotic as well as lordly 
leadership, who emerges from historical selection by success. On the other hand, there 
is the cooperative kind of leadership, including leadership in a free society as well as 
anonymous leadership, which results from an election process by the masses.”(Wieser 
[1926] 1983, p. 39)21.  
As far as masses are concerned, Wieser describes them as “following the leader” 
(ibid. p. 38), although he distinguishes between two forms of following: dead masses or 
blind following; true following. Blind following refers to a passive form of following 
that is reducible to sheep-like behaviour or to normative imitation22: “the model of the 
anonymous leader is being emulated by his environment and subsequently by a wider 
circle as well” (ibid. p. 44). True following, on the contrary, refers to reflective 
searching type of following or active following “which demands of the masses a certain 
independence of conduct and the capacity to adapt to the given circumstances” (ibid. p. 
45). Moreover, in the case of true following, the psychology of masses also displays a 
process of internalization (or even true identification) of power: 
 
“Internal power arouses in the masses the urge for ready emulation. In this 
connection the individual obeys not only his own instinct, but his behavior is also 
determined by the contact he has with the attitude of his environment and that of the 
masses in their entirety. The experience of power is intensified by the fact that the 
individual submitting to power thereby enhances the effective weight of internal 
power in society: he joins the ranks of the social rulers, albeit with a minimal share 
of power” (Wieser [1926] 1983: 57)  
 
This passage suggests a dynamics between masses and leaders that is more complex 
than the term ‘following’ suggests. In fact, as we shall develop, this dynamics cannot be 
described in terms of imitation only. In particular, it involves the interplay of ‘internal 
power’, which constitutes a critical factor of the dynamics between masses and leaders .  
 
Second, Wieser defines internal power as distinguished from external power. He 
conceives “internal power” as being “impersonal and anonymous” (Wieser [1926] 1983, 
p. 3) while “external power” corresponds to the power that some persons or some 
groups exert on people with the help of “external” means such as “numerical 
superiority, arms or wealth” (ibid. p. 3). Internal power may be channelled by several 
means: science and knowledge for instance, through “historical education”, contribute 
to the creation of the social interactions which support social internal power (ibid. p. 
107), while arts rather falls in the category of external power and leaders, even if it is 
rooted in the populace (ibid. p. 113). But the power of knowledge, contrary to ‘faith 
power’, is not a direct power but needs many intermediaries within the ruling classes in 
order to reach masses. It is therefore associated with Wieser’s first law of social growth: 
the tendency toward increasing stratification (ibid. p. 26). 
To a certain extent, the distinction between internal and external power again echoes 
the one between historical formations and social institutions. Internal power indeed 
refers to historical formations conceived as the result of unintended actions while 
external power can be associated with social institutions viewed as human devices 
designed with a specific task or purpose in mind. Similarly as in the case of the 
distinction between historical formations and social institutions, internal and external 
power can hardly be dealt with independently from each other23. As Wieser emphasizes, 
there must be some complementarity and consistency between internal and external 
power. Related to this issue, he criticizes Nietzsche and Spencer’s too emphatic 
conception of the leader or the “great man” which is, according to him, out of touch 
with the reality of masses (ibid. p. 46):  
 
“[i]ndispensable as is the performance of the leader in front for the achievements 
of society, no less so is the following by the masses. If the leader is viewed as the 
sower casting out the seed, the masses may be viewed as the ground which absorbs 
it” (Wiser [1926] 1983: 47) 
 
This quotation brings us back to the issue of methodological individualism and 
holism. As we have emphasized, Wieser is neither satisfied with monist approaches nor 
with dualist ones, as he understands them. So what is the suitable method to be applied? 
Wieser’s answer is not always clear and his argument easy to follow. As we have also 
stressed, when he describes the dynamics between masses and leaders, Wieser clearly 
has in mind something more than passive imitation or ‘blind borrowing’. We could 
argue that the kind of following that he labels ‘true following’ has some common 
features with self-reference imitation, defined by Orléan as a kind of imitation occurring 
when agents imitate but, by so doing, create a social value or a convention that gather 
some momentum and gain some autonomy vis-à-vis individuals that initiated the 
dynamics. By the same token, the idea of “anonymous leadership” could also be 
interpreted as a sophisticated mechanism that involves more than mutual interaction 
between masses and leaders. For, as Wieser indicates, this kind of leadership is 
characterized by the fact that “the social success of small groups can be magnified to 
full-fledged social success if the new strength, which first was formed by the small 
group in its own interest, is removed from its control and placed at the disposal of the 
society as a whole” (ibid. p. 33)24.  
 
The following arguments may indeed support this view.  
First, Wieser refers to the notion of ‘objective spirit’ which he borrowed from 
Dilthey and Freyer, whose teaching was widespread in Germany. He argues that the 
existence of an ‘objective spirit’ plays an essential role in the articulation between 
individuals or masses and leaders and strengthens the coherence of social systems. More 
precisely, this ‘objective spirit’ relates to the commonly observed psychology of social 
human beings to infer from others and share some significations or values:  
 
“Because we ourselves are moved by emotions, follow impulses, act purpose-
oriented, connect mental images, forge concepts, and because this structural 
coherence of minds, characteristic of our very nature, falls within the realm of our 
experience, we can imagine ourselves as partaking in the consequences of the acts of 
foreign human beings and can re-create what spiritual values they contain (…) What 
is foreign becomes a signpost which we are able to follow even when it does not 
guide us simply in a certain direction but leads us to a plenitude of heterogeneous 
realities: languages, literatures, states, architectural styles, churches, customs, arts, 
and systems of sciences” (Freyer, Theory of the objective Spirit, quoted by Wieser 
[1926] 1983: 147) 
 
This idea of ‘objective spirit’ can be interpreted as a means to articulate individual 
beliefs or values with collective ones in a manner that is more sophisticated that the one 
implied by mere imitation. More precisely, for Wieser, the objective spirit of a 
community is more than a signpost: it is “like a current to which we are glad to yield 
because we feel its supporting power and whose superior strength we possibly may not 
be able to escape at all even when we are terrified to discover that it will carry us toward 
the abyss” (ibid, p. 148). In other terms, the ‘objective spirit’ becomes an entity which 
has its own developmental mechanisms, such as inertia, self-preservation (ibid. p. 124) 
and destructive power. However, its autonomy vis-à-vis individuals “must not 
undermine our recognition that it is borne out of the spirit of the united individuals” 
(ibid, p. 149).  
The idea of ‘objective spirit’ can also be related to Wieser’s notion of social egoism, 
which he already developed in Social Economics. For Wieser, social egoism is 
conceived as an intrinsic component of the psychology of human beings implying that 
“by reason of the social egoism a man is ready to fit into the social order which includes 
both submission and domination” (Wieser [1914] 1927 1967, p. 161). 
 
Second, Wieser refers to the notion of success, a concept that he shares with Menger 
by the way. But, in contrast to Menger, for Wieser, the notion of success encompasses 
more than the idea of the replication by followers of supposedly efficient behaviours 
displayed by leaders. As pointed out by Samuels (op. cit.), Wieser’s concept of 
‘success’ is not defined in abstracto as the achievement of the fittest economic state. In 
particular, depending on the fact that it is actual or perceived, success can also lead to 
negative outcomes, such as dictatorships:  
 
“Success constitutes a mechanism, as it were, of historical selection. The course 
of history is marked by a path of success vis-à-vis other paths which might have 
been. Success in this context signifies survival (…). Success, in Wieser’s analysis, 
has no independent positive or normative, ex ante, test. It is circumstantial, episodic, 
and without external or internal value basis independent of the fact of survival. It is 
the consequence of successes, however, which marks the course of history” 
(Samuels, introduction of the Law of Power, Wieser [1926] 1983, p. xxxi) 
 
Third, Wieser refers to “the law of upward mobility of classes25”, which implies the 
existence of a tendency towards the congruence of beliefs between masses and leaders. 
Indeed, at first, masses have no share in public power, but through social interaction – 
through labor and art essentially, they may have an opportunity to further their personal 
achievements and therefore, to resist the pressure from the leaders and not completely 
succumbing to it. As far as the ruling leaders are concerned, they are themselves aware 
of their own interest in augmenting the vigor of the people to utilize it better, so that the 
more enlightened rulers have a strong affinity for the populace and begin sharing public 
power with it. As Wieser summarizes it:  
 
“In the present epoch, the face of the earth is being technically transformed by the 
alertness of (…) both those in command and those in subordination positions. All 
these quietly evolving and ascending collective forces have in due time been 
transformed into social power or they will do so, acting as a resistance first but 
eventually also sharing leadership roles” (Wieser [1926] 1983: 26) 
 
All these arguments give strong support to an interpretation of Wieser’s approach of 
the emergence of institutions in terms of a more sophisticated dynamics of social 
interaction than the one put forward by Menger. This interpretation is reinforced by 
thorough investigation of Wieser’s remarks regarding Menger’s explanation of the 
emergence of money. In Social Economics, Wieser dedicates several pages to Menger’s 
approach of the emergence of money. If he clearly regards, as Menger, money as one of 
the founding institutions of social economy, he has reservations about the way Menger 
deals with the issue of its emergence. On the one hand, he appreciates Menger’s novel 
“penetrating investigation” into the problem of money which – by taking “the 
phenomenon of money as a paradigm” allowing to show that “all social institutions of 
the economy are nothing more than ‘unintended social results of individual teleological 
factor’ (Untersuchungen, pp. 171-87)” – put an end to the “long series of writers who 
sought to explain money as an individualistic institutions.” (Wieser [1914] 1927 1967: 
163). On the other hand, a few pages later, he point out that:   
 
“Menger’s explanation would be entirely satisfactory if he had appreciated as 
fully the part that the masses play in the development of money as he did that taken 
by leaders. The function of the masses consists in that their imitation establishes the 
universal practice which gives to a rule its binding force and social power. (…) It is 
in keeping with (…) [his] individualistic point of view that he (…) [did] not fully 
appreciate the part played by the masses in the creation of money. (…) Therefore it is 
not possible for him (…) to concede that money represents something more and 
stronger than the will of participating individuals. A money for which a mass habit 
of acceptance has once been established is no longer the mere result of the individual 
aims of leaders whom the masses follow. Neither in the beginning nor later did the 
leaders have in mind a social institution. (…) The final form of money is not a mere 
resultant; because of the universal social resonance that it awoke it represents a 
tremendous strengthening of their endeavors” (Wieser [1914] 1927 1967: 165, 
underlined by us) 
 
From this passage, it follows that the intervention of masses cannot be interpreted as 
an act of pure recognition of the social utility of leaders’ decisions. For reasons that still 
need to be elaborated upon, masses tend to create a final rule “far beyond [leaders]’ 
expectations” (Wieser [1914] 1927 1967: 165). This suggests again an interpretation of 
Wieser’s approach conception of the emergence of institutions in terms of conventions 
(or social norms) or in terms of the supervenience approach, as we already sketched out. 
 
Such an interpretation is also consistent with Wieser’s description of some of the 
characteristics of the social dynamics between leaders and masses. As we have shown, 
for Wieser, this dynamics is not only governed by purely economic interests but also 
includes some extra-economic sociological laws such as the law of power, the law of 
increasing social stratification, the law of upward mobility of classes or the role of 
success. The resulting effect of these mechanisms is all but determinist, even neither can 
it be considered as welfare improving. From this viewpoint, Wieser differentiates 
himself from Menger who implicitly assumes that organic institutions serve the 
common welfare. Additional arguments taken from Wieser’s writings may be put 
forward in order to support this view.  
First, Wieser makes reference to “inner rules” such as inertia effects or self-
destruction mechanisms that underlie the law of power, as the following quotation 
exemplifies:     
 
“A social group, once it has been formed into a unit by the sacrificium voluntatis 
of its members, cannot easily be jolted by the sacrifices which it demands of them. 
Once success has induced leaders and masses to go together, failure will not 
automatically induce separation in spite of the losses caused by it” (Wieser [1926] 
1983: 26) 
 
Those mechanisms belong to the psychology of power and constitute what Wieser 
refers as the ‘supra-social’ or ‘anti-individual’ or even ‘anti-social’ character of power, 
which stands “in complete reversal to the law of success” (Wieser [1926] 1983: 71). 
They also contribute to explain the emergence of collective wholes or social entities that 
have acquired some autonomy vis-à-vis individuals. This ‘holistic’ feature does not 
however lead to neglect the role of individuals within social dynamics. Wieser indeed 
explains that personal strength is at the origin of the growing of power but, “by aligning 
itself with the strength of a like-minded individuals, [it] is being enhanced way beyond 
its inherent potential[,] [a]longside it, there is a strengthening of the feeling of power, 
though at the same time strength in no small degree is being deprived of its personal 
roots” (ibid. p. 70).  
 
Moreover, by emphasizing the relation of individuals towards their neighbourhood 
but also towards the society considered as a whole entity, Wieser is able, in contrast to 
Menger, to deal with the issue of the evolution (and not only of the emergence) of 
institutions.  For instance, Wieser points out the possibility of conflicts between a new 
historical task and existing historical powers (ibid. p. 203), or the existence of tensions 
regarding the sharing of power between the leadership strata and the strata representing 
the masses (ibid. p. 52). In mathematical terms, leaving aside the well-know 
reservations of Austrian economics about the use of mathematical relationships, these 
conflicts or tensions could be assimilated to path-dependency or hysteresis effects. 
 
To conclude, Wieser is far from being a faithful following of Menger. His overall 
scheme of thought displays original thinking on several issues. First, on the 
methodological ground, Wieser’s combination of individualism and holism and of 
economic analysis and economic sociology is very insightful and demonstrates quite 
convincingly, by using the method of successive approximations, the limits of pure 
economics, in particular regarding power considerations. From this perspective, his 
contribution is comparable to the one of Pareto (see Ragni in this volume) or 
Schumpeter (concerning Schumpeter, see the introduction of Arena and Dangel-
Hagnauer, 2002). Second, by facing the problem of the influence of individual and 
social knowledge as well as systems of beliefs on economic and social phenomena, he 
offers a broader conception of rationality, where beliefs and action cannot be dealt with 
separately but determine each other. This concern, which is to-day very lively among 
social philosophers and sociologists, makes Wieser’s contribution very topical. Third, 
Wieser’s contribution is also very enlightening regarding institutional matters. In 
particular, it provides some foundations for an analysis of the dynamics of institutions 
based on interlocking groups of agents and conflicting interests rooted in power and 
social strata. 
 
 
4.4. Concluding remarks 
 
Menger and Wieser approaches to the problem of the emergence of institutions share 
some common features. On the one hand, they both see it as the “unintended social 
results of individual tendencies” (Menger [1927] 1967). On the other hand, both authors 
introduce a distinction between leaders and followers or masses, which underlies a 
further distinction between innovative and imitative behaviours. However, for Wieser, 
those two kinds of behaviour may overlap, because they also are rooted and subject to 
the law of power.  This original feature of Wieser also permits to provide an analysis 
not only of the emergence but also on the evolution of institutions. Furthermore, they 
both appreciate the role of knowledge in economic and social phenomena in general, 
and in the more particular case of the emergence of institutions. As we have shown, 
both explanations of the emergence of institutions involve the interplay of individual 
and collective knowledge (or beliefs). If they both attempt to analyse the phenomenon 
of economic or social institutions from the perspective of interactions between 
individuals, they however differentiate from one another as regards the dynamic process 
underlying those interactions. On one hand, Menger takes for granted the involuntary 
formation of shared knowledge about the validity of social institutions such as money. 
On the other hand, Wieser favours an explanation whereby collective beliefs are more 
than shared knowledge since they do have some autonomy vis-à-vis individuals.  
A we have stressed Wieser’s emphasis on the psychology of masses and leaders lead 
him to consider the influence of compulsion forces, besides the forces of freedom or 
“natural controls”, on the historical formations underpinning institutions, while they are 
discarded by Menger. This also explains why Wieser views historical development and 
social institutions as radically non deterministic, and possibly welfare damaging, while 
Menger implicitly assumes, judging from his analysis of the emergence of money, that 
they are always welfare enhancing. To this extent, Menger’s analysis is limited to the 
emergence of institutions, viewed as a ‘discovery’ process, while Wieser’s is more 
focused on the dynamics of institutions, seen as a creative-destructive process.  
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1 This renewed interest has already swept many fields in economics such as decision 
theory, game theory, finance and organizational theory as well as neighbouring 
disciplines such as sociology, psychology or social philosophy. This increasing interest 
for analysing the role of knowledge and beliefs in economic phenomena is also 
characterized by increasing confusion regarding the use of the concepts of knowledge 
and beliefs in the various fields of social sciences. It is clear that a more systematic and 
general reflection on the role of knowledge and beliefs still needs to be carried out but 
this is beyond the scope of this paper (see Arena and Festré 2006a). 
 
2 Apart from the most famous Austrian authors, one should mention, in particular, Fritz 
Machlup, who is less known as an Austrian economist but also contributed to this field 
of research. His contribution is summarized in the 3 of the 10 projected volume series: 
Knowledge: its creation, distribution and economic significance published respectively 
in 1980, 1982 and 1984. 
 
3 For a study of the place of knowledge and economic beliefs in the second generation 
of the Austrian School see Arena and Festré 2006b. 
 
4 Cf. the opposition between real time and Newtonian time made by O’ Driscoll and 
Rizzo (1984). 
 
5 In support of this interpretation, see, for instance Birner (1999) and Garrouste (1999). 
 
6 Hayek defines knowledge as a “system of rules of action supported and modified by 
rules indicating similarities and differences between combinations of stimuli” (Hayek 
1978, p. 41). 
 
7 Menger’s conception of knowledge is indeed difficult to specify precisely because it 
represents a very far-reaching form of knowledge. It includes general and explicit 
knowledge like scientific knowledge but also some more local forms of knowledge, that 
might be assimilated to the “knowledge of the circumstances of time and space”, to use 
Hayek’s terminology.   Concerning this more local forms of knowledge, one can 
distinguish between explicit kinds of local knowledge that are articulable on one hand, 
and tacit, unconscious and non articulable local knowledge (see see Fleetwood 1997, 
pp. 164-166).  
 
8 This dilemma can be expressed as follows: if a firm always seeks specialization, this 
can be made only at the expense of adaptability in face of unexpected changes on the 
demand side. On this point, cf. Dulbecco and Garrouste (1999). 
 
9 In passing, this is an issue that Hicks will address seriously and that gives his 
contribution a strong Austrian complexion.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
10 From a methodological viewpoint, the case of the emergence of money or more 
generally of organic institutions  comes under the case of the “exact orientation of 
economic research”, while pragmatic institutions  refer to the  “empirical realist 
approach” (Menger [1883] 1963: 55-61)  
 
11 Menger in fact constructed the German word Absatzfähigkeit to refer to the property 
of marketability by merging two words: Absatz meaning something like ‘the possibility 
of sale’ or ‘to find a market for’ and Fähigkeit meaning ‘the capability’ or ‘the ability’.   
 
12 in the sense that a more marketable good is more exchangeable and then becomes 
more marketable. 
 
13 Referring to Orlean’s typology of imitation (informational, self-reference and 
normative imitation). 
 
14 One may refer here to some kind of knowledge creation following Nonaka and 
Takeuchi (1995). 
 
15 The process of emergence of money can also depicted as a “stochastically stable 
strategy” (Young, 1988; see Garrouste 2003 110-111). In other terms, the institution of 
money emerges partly as the result of chance, and partly as the consequence of the 
better knowing of some agents of the intrinsic properties of the commodity that is likely 
to be commonly accepted. 
 
16As Stigler (1941) puts it, Wieser’s contribution on capital theory “occupies a position 
of indisputable importance in the history of economics” and he “presented one of the 
best theories of capital which had emerged” in his time (Stigler 1941, pp. 158, 177; 
quoted by Endres 1991, p. 68). 
 
17 For Wieser, there are not one but two theories of distribution: the first one measures 
the efficiency of productive services; the second determines the allocation of wealth. 
This distinction is made by a French sociologist economist, Roche Agussol, 
in “Friedrich von Wieser”, Revue d’Economie Politique, 1930, nos 4 and 5, p. 53, 
quoted by F. Perroux in his Introduction to the French Translation of Schumpeter’s 
Theory of Economic Development, Paris: Dalloz, p. 31. 
 
18As indicated by Warren J. Samuels in his introduction to the 1983 English translation 
of Das Gesetz der Macht, as early as in Social Economics, power is seriously taken into 
account since it constitutes, together with the principle of utility, the “twin organizing 
principles” of Wieser’s theoretical economic framework. This feature had not been 
unnoticed by Oskar Morgenstern, who wrote in his obituary to Wieser that Social 
Economics had been the “greatest systematic treatise that has been written by an 
Austrian in which the principle of marginal utility is analyzed in all its ramifications” 
(Morgenstern 1927, p. 671, quoted by Samuels in the introduction of the Law of Power, 
Wieser [1926] 1983, p. xv). 
 
19 This is a feature that he shares with Schumpeter. See Festré and Garrouste (2008a) 
                                                                                                                                               
 
20 In passing, it is interesting to note that Menger’s distinction between pragmatic and 
organic institutions is purely formal since he neither elaborates on, nor give examples of 
pragmatic institutions. 
 
21 Here again, one may be tempted to apply Menger’s typology of pragmatic vs. organic 
to the notion of leadership. The analogy is however quite superficial. What is arguable, 
however, is that Wieser is more focused on historical formations and cooperative 
leadership and that he privileges causal-genetic explanations, which places him squarely 
in Menger’s tradition from this viewpoint. 
 
22 If we stick to Orléan’s definition (op. cit.), normative imitation occurs in situations 
where people, for reputation motives, are inclined to imitate the behaviour of others, by 
fear of sanctions or social disapproval. In the case of authoritarian leadership, this type 
of behaviour is very common. 
 
23 In contrast to Menger’s treatment of organic vs. pragmatic institutions, as we already 
pointed out above in this article. 
 
24 In passing, this quotation could be put in perspective with the notion of heteronomy, 
borrowed from political philosophy, and defined as the subordination or subjection of 
individuals to the law of another or to something else that individuals fail to see. This 
notion is in sharp contrast with the a widespread idea among Austrian authors of the 
autonomy of the individual vis-à-vis the State. As rightly put forward by J-P Dupuy, 
this boils down to the theoretical problem of the articulation between two kinds of 
autonomy: 1) the autonomy of the individual freed from any relation of subordination 
towards the sacred, the State or the social whole; 2) the social autonomy, which does 
not mean that men do control the society, quite the opposite: the society escape them, it 
seems to be endowed with a life on its own, foreign to the individuals that form it (see J-
P. Dupuy 1992, p. 247). 
 
25 This law defines the second law of social growth, the first one being, as we already 
mentioned, the “law of increasing social stratification”. 
